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Stem Cell Research: Magical Promise v. Moral Peril
Robert D. Orr, M.D., C.M.* and C. Christopher Hook, M.D.
It was not often that the word "magic" appeared in scientific literature
until the advent of the stem cell. Now, this terminology seems to appear
more and more often. If even half of the promises offered in the lay and
professional literature come to pass regarding the magical nature of the
stem cell, perhaps this hyperbole will be forgiven.
The potential for using stem cells to cure or ameliorate a host of
genetic, metabolic, and degenerative conditions has been recognized only
in the past few years, and this recognition has led to a major redirection of
research efforts. In this relatively short time, a mixture of facts and fantasy
has propelled the issue into the headlines; the surrounding fervor is fueled
not only by the promises of magic, but also by the recognition that
research and therapy with stem cells is not merely a scientific issue-it is
also a profoundly moral issue.
While recognizing that stem cell research is also the subject of much
scientific and political debate, this Case Study will focus primarily on the
moral aspects. The nub of the moral issue is the source of the stem cells
that are needed for research and therapy.
I. EMBRYONIC V. ADULT STEM CELLS
Human stem cells for research or therapy can be of embryonic, adult,
or fetal origin. Embryonic stem (ES) cells can be derived from (1) embryos
created specifically for the purpose of research; (2) "leftover" frozen
embryos created for the purposes of in vitro fertilization; or (3) cell lines
perpetuated in the lab, which were derived from either (1) or (2). Adult
stem (AS) cells can be found in umbilical cord blood and placental tissue,
as well as in many adult tissues, including bone marrow, fat, and brain.
Fetal stem cells can be derived from primordial germ cells or the gonadal
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tissue of an aborted fetus.'
In the stem cell debate, some individuals see no moral issue regarding
the origin of the cells and are ready to proceed with whatever research
shows promise. Most, however, recognize the moral issue and want to show
due respect for the human embryo, but, on balance, are willing to
compromise the moral issue in order to accomplish the promised magic.
Others urge serious reflection on the moral issue and conclude that if
there are two ways to approach the magic, one ethically troubling and
another avoiding the moral issue, then we should take the moral high
ground, using AS cells first and ES cells only if the former do not produce
the desired results. Still others believe that ES cells should not be used
even in the absence of morally acceptable alternatives.
Many researchers resist the urge to use AS cells, based upon the
assertion that AS cells will not work as well as ES cells. Indeed, researchers
initially believed that AS cells are more difficult to isolate and use.
However, recent advances challenge this belief. After reporting on the
successful isolation of AS cells from fat removed in liposuction, researcher
Mark Hedrick stated, "This could take the air right out of the debate about
embryonic stem cells. It makes it hard to argue that we should use
embryonic stem cells.,2 Further, and of even greater significance, it was
initially assumed that ES cells were pluripotent (i.e., could transform into
any cell type) while AS cells were merely multipotent (i.e., could transform
into a limited number of cell types). However, reports of human AS cells
transformed into liver, nerve, bone, cartilage, fat, blood, heart, and other
types of cells has prompted a rethinking of this assumption as well. In
announcing the laboratory transformation of AS cells from bone marrow
into brain cells, researcher Ira Black revealed to his doubting colleagues
the feasibility of something they, just a few months earlier, had declared
impossible. He concluded his announcement with the statement that
"biological dogma has to be rethought."
3
Not only have the previous assumptions been proven incorrect, but
also, there are other reasons that AS cells may at least theoretically have
advantages over ES cells. Using stem cells from the patient into whom the
transformed cells will be subsequently implanted avoids the difficult issue
of histo-incompatibility. Additionally, there is a greater propensity for ES
cells to undergo uncontrolled transformation and growth, generating
concern about malignant degeneration.
Fundamental to the issues at hand are conceptual questions about the
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II. THE BEGINNING AND THE END OF LIFE
Sperm and ova are human gametes. If left undisturbed, they will
remain human gametes. However, once the twenty-three chromosomes
from the sperm and the twenty-three from the ovum unite, they form a
unique human being with the potential to pass through all of the stages of
human growth and development-zygote, blastocyst, embryo, fetus,
neonate, infant, child, adolescent, and adult.
Some argue that the zygote or blastocyst does not constitute a human
being because each lacks the differentiated cells and tissues characteristic
of human beings. Further, some argue that the blastocyst (or even the
embryo or the fetus) is only a "potential human being." Potentiality has
two possible meanings. First, it may mean that the item might evolve into
the item mentioned, or it might possibly turn into something else. Second,
potentiality may just mean that the projected evolution might or might not
happen. The human blastocyst fails both of these tests of potentiality. Once
it has been formed, the blastocyst cannot develop into a dog or a sheep; it
is inherently and unchangeably human and, barring unforeseen
intervention, will inevitably continue to develop into a human individual.
The cells resulting from the first two or three divisions of the zygote
retain totipotency (i.e., if they are naturally or artificially separated, each
can develop into identical copies of the others). Some argue that these
cells are then not true human individuals. We would respond that they are
indeed human individuals with the potential of becoming twins.
AS cells are human cells in the same way that blood cells, brain cells,
or muscle cells are human. They are living cells with forty-six
chromosomes. Thus, they are human cells. They reside within human
tissue that in turn is part of a human individual. AS cells can be removed
from a human individual without causing any harm to that individual. But
the AS cell is not a human individual as is a zygote or blastocyst.
ES cells are also human cells in that they reside within human tissue.
Prior to passing the point of potential twinning, each one is a potential
human individual. After that point, they are human cells that make up the
blastocyst-one stage of humanhood. In theory, removing one stem cell
from a blastocyst would be morally comparable to removing stem cells
from an adult's bone marrow. However, the reality is that the removal of
that stem cell from the blastocyst necessarily destroys the blastocyst and
thus the human individual. Herein lies the moral problem.
This essential nature of humanhood is inherent to the individual. It is
not something that is imputed based on the location of the individual.
Some maintain that implantation in the uterus is a more logical time to
3
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identify the individual than is fertilization. While it is clear that pregnancy
begins with implantation, the human life has already been in existence for
several days prior to the beginning of pregnancy. It is interesting and
ironic that in the abortion debate, many argue that it is not a human until
it is "out of the uterus," while in the stem cell debate many argue that it is
not a human until it is "in the uterus." These arguments based on the
individual's location are feeble attempts to deny the basic fact understood
and accepted by scientists for many generations: Humanhood begins with
the union of twenty-three chromosomes from the ovum with twenty-three
chromosomes from the sperm.
Humanhood continues from fertilization until the death of the human
individual. Certainly human cells and even human tissue can die while the
human individual survives. Conversely, human cells and human tissue can
sometimes survive for a while after the death of the individual. But there is
a time when the human individual ceases to exist. Identification of this
"time of death" continues to be the subject of scientific and philosophical
debate. There can be little debate, however, that removal of cells from a
blastocyst leads to the immediate death of the blastocyst, constituting the
intentional destruction of that developing human individual.
III. THE ETHICS OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH AND STEM CELLS
Having established that the human blastocyst or embryo is a human
individual and thus should be accorded the same protections as other
human beings, we now turn to the implications this has on the conduct of
research. Human subjects research has been the focus of several
international codes as well as extensive legislation in the United States. All
of this legislation rests upon a common theme: Human beings are not
commodities, and human beings must never be used as means to an end,
but must always remain the end in themselves. Proposals to destroy
embryos for research purposes clearly violate this most basic of ethical
principles.
The first major international code of conduct in human subjects
research is the Nuremberg Code, created in response to abuses of human
subjects perpetrated by German doctors practicing under the Third Reich.
The following quotes from the Code pertain to the topic at hand:
(2) The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the
good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and
not random and unnecessary in nature.
(3) The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of
animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the
11:1 (2001)
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disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will
justify the performance of the experiment.
(4) The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical and mental suffering and injury.
(5) No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason
to believe that death and disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in
those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as
subjects.
(7) Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided
to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of
injury, disability, or death.4
A subsequent guide to human subjects research is the Declaration of
Helsinki, published by the World Medical Association. The introduction to
this set of research guidelines states, "considerations related to the well-
being of the subject should take precedence over the interests of science
and society. ' ' 5 Amongst its Basic Principles, it states, "It is the duty of the
physician in medical research to protect the life, health, privacy, and
dignity of the human subject."6 It further states, "Every medical research
project involving human subjects should be preceded by careful assessment
of predictable risks and burdens in comparison with foreseeable benefits to
the subject or to others."7
In 1997, the European Union (EU) declared that, "The interests and
welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society
and science."8 With regard to an individual who cannot consent to
involvement in research, the EU stated that, "an intervention may only be
carried out on a person who does not have the capacity to consent, for his
or her direct benefit."9
The 1979 Belmont Report published by the National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research
laid the foundation for research ethics in the United States. It said that
research involving human subjects should be guided by the principles of
beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice.' The current U.S. statute
governing human subjects research, known as the Common Rule, defines
"human subject" as "a living individual about whom an investigator
[whether professional or student] conducting research obtains (1) data
through intervention or interaction with the individual, or (2)
indentifiable private information."" Specifically addressing research
involving wards and children unable to give assent, the Common Rule
states that research involving greater than minimal risk that will not yield
direct benefit to the child, but will most likely produce generalizable
knowledge about the child's disease or condition, requires that an
5
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institutional review board (IRB) find the risk to be only a minor increase
over minimal risk and that the procedures be "reasonably commensurate"
with those inherent in the child's condition. 12 Furthermore, if the research
involves risk beyond this category, it is necessary that the research offers a
reasonable opportunity to understand, prevent, or ameliorate a serious
problem that affects the health and welfare of children.
3
In addition to these regulations, the U.S. National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (NBAC) declared that "the derivation of stem cells from
embryos... is justifiable only if no less morally problematic alternatives are
available for advancing the research."
4
How then does ES cell research measure up to these standards of
human research ethics? Animal models are still being developed and have
not matured to the point of justifying the extraordinary claims for ES cell
treatments. Thus, any claim that human embryos need to be destroyed
now is unjustified. The data to date strongly suggest that the desired results
are procurable using other means than ES cell research.' 5 The risks and
burdens to the subject are clear, and proceeding with ES cell research
clearly disregards the welfare and well-being of the subject for the sake of
the "good of society." Further, these human embryos are not being
exploited for the benefit of other embryos or very young children, but
explicitly for adults, generally with adult-onset disorders. In summary, the
proposed destruction of human embryos for research purposes is a clearly
unethical violation of accepted principles, guidelines, and codes for
human subjects research.
IV. RATIONALE FOR ES CELL RESEARCH
Research abuses perpetrated on post-natal subjects led to the
development of these codes. However, it is eerily disturbing that arguments
offered in the current debate about stem cell research employ the same
rationales as those used by German physicians in their defense during the
Nuremberg Trials. The following key points of comparison have been
gleaned from a more complete enumeration by Michael Grodin."
First, "[r]esearch is necessary in times of war and national emergency.
Military and civilian survival may depend on the scientific and medical
knowledge derived from human experimentation. Extreme circumstances
demand extreme action." 7 We are confronting a crisis of phenomenal
proportions as millions are afflicted with diabetes, Parkinson's disease,
Alzheimer's disease, and cancer. Indeed, the rhetoric of war is so
prominent in the stem cell discussion that some researchers have claimed
that the suffering of millions will be on the hands of those who do not
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Second, "[t]he prisoners utilized for human experimentation were
already condemned to death."' 9 Geneticist Jerome Lejeune has called these
"leftover" frozen embryos prisoners in "the concentration can. 20 It has
been claimed that these individuals should be used for research purposes
since their fate is already doomed.
Third, "[e]xperimental subjects were selected by the military leaders of
the prisoners themselves. An individual physician thus could not be held
responsible for the selections."21 Similarly, the NBAC argued that the
"leftover" embryos have been rejected by their parents and, thus, that the
research community bears no responsibility for their deaths.2
Fourth, "[s] ometimes it is necessary to tolerate a lesser evil, the killing
of some, to achieve a greater good, the saving of many.
2 3
Finally, "[w] ithout human experimentation, there would be no way to
advance the progress of science and medicine."24 While this statement is
indeed true, codes, guidelines, and regulations have been developed
specifically for the purpose of bridling this research enthusiasm with
ethical principles. One such principle is that human subjects research is
never to result deliberately in the death of the subject, regardless of how
much supposed good may result from the investigation.
Moreover, the Nuremberg tribunal, guided by the overarching
principle that human beings are never to be treated as a means to an end,
but must always be ends in themselves, soundly rejected the above
arguments. It is sad and ironic that as the generation that bequeathed to us
the Nuremberg Code is passing, we are discarding the wisdom it gained at
such a high price. Using identical utilitarian and pragmatic reasoning,
contemporary politicians, scientists, and the public at large are endorsing
the commodification and destruction of members of our human family.
We are equating neither stem cell researchers with Nazi physicians,
nor this issue with the Holocaust. We recognize that proponents of ES cell
research are motivated by the desire to benefit individuals and society and
not by racist eugenic policy. The focus of our argument is on human
subjects research abuses. The historical record is clear that the logic and
reasoning used to justify those abuses is identical to that being used today
to justify the destruction of embryos. This should make us all pause and
seriously reconsider these actions and proposals. Instances of human
subjects abuse in America have resulted from the same flawed thinking.
The Tuskegee syphilis study that devalued and commodified African-
American men, the Willowbrook hepatitis study that commodified
individuals with mental retardation, as well as others, claimed to focus on
the greater good for the larger community. Yet, each suffered from the
flaw of reducing its subjects to means to a larger end.
7
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We must also address the "stewardship" argument that is used to
support the use of human embryos that are "leftovers" from in vitro
fertilization. This argument maintains that the life will be lost anyway, as
the embryo is destined to be thawed and discarded at the choice of the
conceiving parents, and that we should allow the so-called redemption of
this loss by using that life for research purposes. We must consider,
though, that doing so only accepts and supports the erroneous and tragic
approach of the infertility industry that perceives children as products and
embryos as commodities. In reality, each embryo conceived is a child of the
conceiving couple, and it is brazenly irresponsible to promote the idea that
the parents have a right to discard as excess material the very child whom
they deliberately conceived. A society that chooses to capitalize on this
tragedy acts as opportunists, not as stewards.
If we are truly interested in the stewardship of the lives in question, we
should promote responsible methods of assisting reproduction that do not
result in the problem of having excess embryos. We should restrict
fertilization to the number of embryos that the couple is willing to implant.
Alternatively, we might insist that cryo-preservation occur at the pronuclear
phase before fertilization is complete and a new, genetically unique human
being has been conceived. This method has been demonstrated to be
superior in terms of outcomes, yet the vast majority of fertility programs
still cryo-preserve unimplanted embryos post-fertilization during the true
embryonic phase. Further, when unimplanted embryos do exist, we should
promote embryo donation and adoption.'
Moreover, if we as a society actually believed in "stewardship," we
would support research on prisoners condemned to death, and we would
remove their transplantable organs either with or without consent. Yet,
when recent Washington hearings discussed such practices taking place in
other countries, the response, very appropriately, was one of horror and
condemnation. 6 These events are not acceptable, because they cross a line
that must not be crossed-they commodify human beings and reduce
them to means to an end. Similarly, we cannot in good conscience demean
and commodify another group of our human family, targeting them for
destruction and harvesting them for a larger "social good."
V. REGULATION AND FUNDING OF STEM CELL RESEARCH
The moral issues raised by the use of stem cells for research or therapy
has led to legal prohibition or restriction in many jurisdictions. In the
United States, a lack of federal legislation governing this issue has resulted
in intense political discussion of the provision of federal funds-a debate
that strongly echoes the debate on federal funding for abortion services.
11:1 (2001)
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While this Case Study will not review this political issue, the recent
attempts at compromise deserve commentary.
President Clinton issued an executive order that allowed the use of
federal funds for stem cell research, with the condition that federal dollars
were not to be used to fund the actual retrieval of those stem cells. That
compromise allowed the contemporaneous destruction of blastocysts using
non-federal funds and the immediate transfer of those stem cells to
federally funded research. President Bush proposed funding regulations
that (1) encourage research with stem cells not of embryonic origin (free
of moral implications) and (2) limit research on ES cells to the
approximately sixty existing cell lines.
The primary issue raised by these compromises is that of moral
complicity. Does the use of the product-or even information-gleaned
from an immoral act implicate the current user in the moral wrong? An
analogy often cited in an attempt to deny the concern of moral complicity
is the transplantation of organs retrieved from a person who has been
murdered. This does not implicate the surgeons or the recipient in the
murder. Additionally, it redeems some good from that horrible act.
Debate about moral complicity has gone on without consensus
regarding the use of data from immoral research, the use of illustrations
made by the Nazi anatomist Eduard Pernkopf, the military use of
information gained by Japanese biological warfare from 1932 to 1945, the
use of vaccines developed using aborted fetal tissue, and other such
atrocities. Some believe that the use of such information dishonors those
who were immorally harmed or killed. Others claim redeeming value in
salvaging some goodness from the immoral acts. The American Medical
Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs concluded: "If
ethically tainted data that have been validated by vigorous scientific
analysis are the only data of that nature available, and such data are
necessary to save lives, then the utilization of such data by physicians and
editors may be appropriate.
The issue of separation of actions and intentions is determinative in
discussions of moral complicity. In the Clinton compromise, the acts of
retrieval of stem cells and research were separated, but the intentions were
not. This disparity leads us to conclude that this compromise involved
significant moral complicity of the researchers and of the author of the
compromise.
The second part of the Bush compromise also raises the question of
moral complicity. The acts that produced those sixty cell lines involved the
immoral destruction of human blastocysts or embryos. The subsequent use
of the perpetuated cell lines does not involve any inherent immorality, but
9
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it may involve moral complicity. Given that cell lines can be used in
research and therapy for years, this issue is not a trivial one.
This sequence of events initially seems morally comparable to the use
of organs retrieved from a murder victim. The murder is immoral, but the
transplant is not; embryo destruction is immoral, but the research is not.
But they are not the same. The difference is that the intention of the
murderer is murder, not transplantation. The intention of those
researchers who originally retrieve the stem cells is the use of those cells in
research. To pick a point in time to distinguish allowable use from
disallowed use is clearly arbitrary. Thus, current researchers may not be
fully absolved from moral complicity, since they are using cell lines
perpetuated after an immoral act for the actual purpose intended by the
immoral act.
If President Bush had said, "I'm going to wait until there seems to be
enough cell lines to declare a moratorium," that would have involved
moral complicity. However, on the first opportunity he had to affect the
direction of this research issue, he said, "While it is unethical to end life in
medical research, it is ethical to benefit from research where life and death
decisions have already been made."' His political compromise followed
this reasoning.
As such, his compromise is not totally morally clean, but it is morally
acceptable. It will never be justifiable, however, to say, "We don't have
enough basic material. We need to allow another batch of cell lines
through the gate." This would negate the arbitrary separation of allowed
and disallowed research.
CONCLUSION
The retrieval of ES cells for use in research or therapy involves the
immoral destruction of human individuals. Several codes of research ethics
prohibit the use or destruction of human individuals for the benefit of
others. The use of AS cells to pursue the magical promises of this research
avoids this moral problem. The current compromise raises some issue of
moral complicity, but it is morally acceptable as a one-time event.
11:l1 (200 1)
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